WEATHER: Early morning low cloud base, rain easing during morning but clearing to a fine day with lengthy sunny periods by afternoon.

OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

We had been briefed the day previous to Adler Tag that we would be going across the Channel in strong formations to attack England. At last, we would be concentrating in large bomber formations with a fighter escort. For so long, we had been flying our individual missions on simple operations like photographic reconnaissance or minelaying duties. Some, like us, had not even seen a British fighter or even fired a shot in anger and it hardly seemed as if a war was on at all. Now, our airfields had many bombers at the ready, many had been flown in from inland airfields, and I could see that now our great Luftwaffe would be at last attacking England.

Feldwebel Karl Hoffmann 1/KG30

Luftwaffe Intelligence reported absurdly inflated RAF losses and damage to airfields and vital installations, but they could not delude themselves about the alarming losses to Göring's Air Fleets. Contrary to German belief, Fighter Command could just about tolerate its losses of aircraft by replacement from the factories, but exhaustion and death were taking a critical toll of its experienced Pilots. The British commanders' greatest fear was that the Germans would smash the delicate defensive network by their attacks on the Sector Operations Rooms, radar stations and communications links. Some British pilots were becoming increasingly angry that they were again and again in squadron strength against huge forces of enemy aircraft. From now until the end, Dowding and Park had to resist fierce pressure to throw everything they had into the sky against the big attacks. But the essence of their brilliant handling of the struggle was that they saw so clearly that in a battle of attrition, they must be defeated. Fighter Command must achieve its victory simply by continuing to exist.

Len Deighton Battle of Britain 1980 Jonathan Cape pp128-129

"We were ordered to get a good nights sleep and wake early. This was the day that all Germany had been waiting for. Up until now most of the Luftwaffe pilots were a little frustrated because each time that we went out we thought that it was the start of the planned attack on England, and all we accomplished was the sinking of merchantmen that were plying the Channel. But we were now assured that at last that we will not be attacking channel convoys but we would be going over England itself. Our orders on this day was to make way clear for the main attack that was planned for the following day.

Luftwaffe pilot based at Air Fleet 2

The way was now clear for them to implement Adlerangriff.

"I had seen the fighter escort earlier and had observed some unusual antics by Joachim Huth but thought that he was only trying to indicate to me that he had made the rendezvous with our bombers. We carried on through the cloud which although hindered our visibility, it was at times very heavy in places, I received a misunderstood message from the second wing leader radio operator 'Angriff ausfuhren' which was the order to proceed with attack. I kept a look out and instructed other crews to do the same but we saw no sign of the escort, we assumed that in the cloud they were keeping their distance.

I was constantly on the lookout for some of my less experienced pilots in these conditions as it was easy to stray too close to another aircraft. Then suddenly there was a break in the cloud. We were at about 10,000 feet and on course coming in to the Thames Estuary. I could see the coast of North Kent to my left. We had passed the naval base of Sheerness which was one of our targets, but the other target of Eastchurch Airfield lay dead ahead. What is even more surprising, was that with only ten minutes flying time to the RAF airfield we had no opposition, it now seemed that Eastchurch was there for the taking.

Oberst Joachim Fink Commander Kampfgeschwader 2

Mayer's starts to make his own run but he is wary as a formation of Bf110s begins to dive. Waiting for the right instant he executes a climbing right turn into them. From almost head-on he presses his firing button and sees part of the roof and fuselage of one Messerschmitt break off. Swinging around in a tight turn he finds a Ju 88 below and dives after it. He fires a five- second burst and the bomber bursts into flames. Mayer's is now alone and he searches the sky to locate his section. He spots 5 Ju 88s making for France and climbs up to intercept. He makes a beam attack, sweeping the whole formation from front to rear. One bomber falls behind and seeks safety in cloud cover. Mayer's follows, manages to relocate his prey and fires off his remaining ammunition. With one engine burning, the German plane loses height.
Harried by three squadrons of British fighters, the Ju 88s miss their targets, disperse into small groups and make a disorderly retreat back to France.

Dennis Newton A Few of the Few 1990 Australian War Memorial p94

On the airfield, men could scarcely take it in. The station commander, Group Captain Frank Hopps, awoke in bed to the telephone's strident jangle, to find HQ No 16 Group, Coastal Command on the line: 'We think that there may be some bandits bound for you.' Barely had Hopps pulled on his flying boots and dived for a slit trench outside than from 9,000 feet the bombs came screaming down. As plaster dust seethed like fog across the airfield, Hopps could only think despairingly: my God. the stations worth millions - some accountants got a job to do writing off this lot.

Richard Collier - Eagle Day/Battle of Britain pp51-52

Oberleutnant Heinz Schlegel, flying Finks rear-guard formation, had seen Eastchurch looming straight ahead but hadn't dropped a single bomb; the Spitfires of 74 Squadron had swooped from the sun too swiftly. There was rending clatter, and the starboard spluttered and died; the Dornier was yawning violently to the left. A hot, yellow light flashed before Schlegel's eyes, and now the port engine was in trouble too. Breaking for cloud cover, Schlegel fought to keep the Dornier airborne, steering what he hoped was due south. Then the clouds parted and his spirits rose exultantly, only to sink again as quickly; land loomed beneath them but it wasn't familiar terrain.

Cautiously, Oberleutnant Gerhardt Oszwald, the navigator, voiced what all of them felt: ' I don't think this is France. Shall we make it?' Schlegel realized they wouldn't so, grimly, he set the Dornier careening for the flat English pastures, seeing too late that the one unobstructed field for which he had aimed was scored by a deep trench. Swaying from side to side like a truck out of control, the bomber ripped like a juggernaut across the meadowland, then, with a sickening half swing, wrapping its starboard wing round a tree, smashed to a halt.

To the crew's astonishment, they barely had time to crawl from the plane before ten British soldiers came storming through the grass to disarm them, whooping like commanches on the warpath. Bewildered, Schlegel was taken to an outpost of the London Scottish Regiment, near Barham, Kent, and confined in a small office adjoining the unit canteen. At a counter, a long line of men were queuing unhurriedly to buy regimental cap-badges and tartan stocking tabs; from somewhere he heard the far keening of bagpipes. Still dazed from the shock of the forced landing, Schlegel puzzled: If England's due to be conquered in three days, how can they take time off for this?

Richard Collier - Eagle Day/Battle of Britain p56-p57

Attacked out of the sun, the Stukas made a perfect target. On the way the Spitfires dived through five Me109s, breaking them up, Pilot Officer D.M.Crook sending one spinning down into a field on fire. The whole Stuka formation broke up with nine falling in flames or with the crews dead. For once, the Spitfires had altitude, position and surprise and they used it to deadly effect.......

.........The remaining Ju87s missed their main target, Middle Wallop and scattered their bombs over three counties. They hit Andover airfield, but this was not a fighter station and little damage was done.

Derek Wood & Derek Dempster The Narrow Margin Hutchinson 1961 p276

Flying Officer Ian Bayles is leading White Section of 152 Squadron and, coming through thick cloud south of Portland, he sights 20 to 30 Bf110s in a defensive circle. After climbing to a favourable position he leads a dive through the orbiting formation and fires at a 110 from directly above but does not observe any strikes. Pulling into a climb he zooms up and positions himself for an attack on the last machine in the circle. He closes in firing bursts from 300 yards (275m). Crossfire from the German planes is heavy but inaccurate. The 110 he is attacking trails smoke from its port engine but suddenly his Spitfire lurches as if struck by a bullet and Bayles breaks away.

Dennis Newton A Few of the Few 1990 Australian War Memorial p96

We were at a disadvantage, and always will be on any attack made west of Selsey. In the east, our 109s have enough fuel to escort the bombers over the Channel and spend fifteen or twenty minutes over the English coast. To the west it is different, the Channel is much wider, our 109s have to travel further and by the time we are over the English coastline our pilots have to think about turning back. On the 13th August, we wondered why the RAF had not come out to meet us as they normally would, our bombers and their escorts had a clear run all the way. But the RAF had understood that we would use up valuable fuel to the English coast and only when it was nearly time for our fighter escort to turn back did the Spitfires and Hurricanes appear. For them, it meant that they could then attack our bombers without any fear of attack by our fighters.

Adolph Galland III/JG 26 Luftflotte 2

I think, for the enemy coming in from Sheppy, it would take a blind man not to see the Detling Airfield. It seemed to be built on a plateau, much higher than the surrounding countryside. Most of the administration blocks, hangars and even many of the tall buildings could be seen from Rochester, so from the cockpit of an aircraft Detling would stand out like a sore thumb. Most of the buildings were grouped close together as many airfields are, and even the fuel supply area which was away from the main buildings was still on the same side just up near the large hangars.

On the 13th, and it was a nice warmish sort of evening then suddenly we heard the sound of high speed engines getting louder and louder. I was amazed that I saw single engine fighters diving almost vertically then levelling out. As they got closer, I saw the unmistakable black crosses, there must have been forty or fifty Me 109s and as they approached Detling Airfield we could hear the crack of rapid machine gun fire, but to our amazement, no return fire from the airfield defences. They must have been caught by surprise as was everybody else because no air raid warnings had been sounded in the town.

There were some explosions and we saw plumes of black smoke bellow into the air, then another rather odd sound, following the same path as the 109s, single engine dive bombers came over and we could see bombs drop just as they levelled out. Huge explosions could be heard and you could feel the ground vibrate. From where I stood, it seemed as though the whole airfield had exploded. My God, I thought, could this be real, I got out on my bike and hurried to the station feeling sure that we would be called out.

George Adams. Fireman at Rochester.

Park had good warning from radar that a big raid was approaching and responded with an effective blend of enterprise and caution. On his extreme left in Suffolk, he put up small formations over two aerodromes. At the same time, still on the left, he ordered up two Hurricane squadrons and a Spitfire squadron. These aircraft were divided between a convoy in the Thames Estuary and forward aerodromes at Hawkinge and Manston. On the right, he ordered a section of Tangemere's Hurricanes to patrol their base and the rest of the squadron to patrol a line over west Sussex from Arundel to Petworth. He also ordered a squadron of Northolt Hurricanes to take up position over Canterbury from where he could switch them in any desired direction. Finally, he reinforced his left with most of a Spitfire squadron from Kenley and his right with another Tangmere squadron. These dispositions left him with about half his Hurricanes and two-thirds of his Spitfires uncommitted, a fair provision for contingencies in view of the large forces at the Luftwaffe's disposal.

Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1984 p101

CASUALTIES:
0800hrs: Selsey Bill. Hurricane. P3387. 87 Squadron Exeter
F/O R.L. Glyde Missing. (Hit by gunfire from Ju88 and crashed into the sea)
1630hrs: Portland. Hurricane P3177. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Sgt H.J. Marsh Missing. (Believed shot down by Bf109. Failed to return to base)
1650hrs: Portland. Hurricane P3348. 213 Squadron Exeter
Sgt P.P. Norris Killed. (Shot down off Portland and crashed into sea. Body washed ashore in France later)
1950hrs: Eastway. Spitfire R6766 65 Squadron Hornchurch
P/O F.S. Gregory Killed. (Night flying practice. Baled out too low for reasons unknown)