By midday, a few small formations are detected, some of these break up into individual raids sometimes consisting only of one or two aircraft. In 10 Group, Warmwell despatches just one section of 152 Squadron (Spitfires) to intercept a sighting out from Swanage, the bandit is recognised a lone Ju88 but it makes full use of the low cloud and disappears.

Shortly after, another enemy sighting is made and 238 Squadron at St Eval (Hurricanes) are scrambled. The squadron records show that one Ju88 is destroyed and another had been damaged.

605 Squadron (Hurricanes) stationed in the north at Drem also claim one enemy aircraft destroyed, possibly a reconnaissance aircraft that had ventured too close to the coast. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 602 Squadron Westhampnett (Spitfires) both claim to have damaged at least one enemy aircraft in spasmodic and isolated actions. Looking at these figures, it can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.

One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S. Dewar who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems obvious that his Hurricane had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was strafed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.

The bombers of III/KG51 and I/KG54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers on previous attacks often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murky conditions. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a H.E. delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Pauls Cathedral. It buried itself some thirty feet into the ground and the two officer who defused the bomb, Lieutenant R. Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personnel to receive the George Cross for their actions.

A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organised prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readiness. Soon, he said, we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready. But, he stated, our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital.

The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined to preparations of any forthcoming invasion and the commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that they were beginning to think that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt was the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer, there were no fresh orders, he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.

In Britain, the radar operators lay in wait for the tell tale blips that would indicate enemy intrusion across the Channel. Pilots sat around waiting for the telephone to ring, but it was the same story of the last few days. A small piece of action occurred high over Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, but these were recognised as weather reconnaissance aircraft when the British "Y" Service picked up their conversations. No action was taken against these aircraft and Fighter Command allowed them to return back across the Channel without any interception.

A Focke-Wolfe 200 is detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the enemy has penetrated this area and proof that Ireland is not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship 'Longfort' just off the coast at Belfast and also submitted an unidentified vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage. [1]

For both sides, there were further tactical developments within this period. Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Park had more time to assess the situation and gave them greater time to intercept the enemy. Keith Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. The original order of this instruction went out as early as September 5th.

On the other hand, Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command was that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organisation than the tattered remnants of a defeated defence as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given the instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may decide and order the formation to disengage. This order was given by the German High Command.

Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending single aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the enemy. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an aluminium factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and as previously mentioned, the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred. [2]

Small raids did occur during the morning period when two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defences and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked and this time damaged had been sustained to the Royal Chapel.

1200hrs: Keith Park at 11 Group Headquarters had been alerted from a message that originated from the Radio Interception Unit that German weather reconnaissance aircraft had radioed back to their bases that there was seven tenths cloud at 1,500 metres and stated that attacks could be made possible between 1,500 and 2,500 metres. The assessment that Park made, was that under the circumstances, he believed that the Luftwaffe would make spasmodic raids and have the advantage of using the cloud as a cover. He alerted the commanders of selected airfields to place at least one squadron at readiness.

1330hrs: A number of squadron had been scrambled after reports came through that radar had picked up enemy aircraft, and that the general direction was London. Using the cloud to their advantage, it was difficult for the Observer Corps to keep track, but it did appear that the target were either Biggin Hill, Kenley or Croydon. One of the squadrons scrambled was 501 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) who intercepted a small force of He111 bombers and attacked. Most decided to abort but not before one of the Heinkels was shot down.

At the same time, another small raid was centred on Tangmere. One enemy bomber was shot down by 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). Again, the raid was aborted and no damage was sustained on Tangmere aerodrome.

Hitler pointed out that the naval preparations for "Operation Sealion" was now almost complete. "All our barges are now in place, and we have more held in reserve along river banks," he said which was borne out by one of the British Observer Groups which had the day previous seen up to ten large enemy transport ships town a number of barges from Calais to Cap Griz Nez. Spitfires of the PRU had also flown over the Belgian and Dutch coasts and had also reported and photographed the collection of barges. But there again, based on the PRU intelligence, Bomber Command had bombed many of the barge installations at an average of every second night, so what was Hitler trying to pull when he said that "All our barges are in place." Maybe he forgot to add that at least one third of them were submerged at their moorings.

"If we plan now," he went on, ".....the invasion date can be set for one week from now, given that we need five days of good weather to achieve the desired results." But then, haven't we heard that before, from Hermann Göring just prior to Adler Tag in early August. "All I need," he said, "....was five days preparation and we will be ready for the day of the Eagle."

Hitler then went on to state that in the preparation we must make sure that the Luftwaffe has complete air superiority over the Channel and over southern England. But again, a remark that had been heard before, when issuing the order to Göring prior to Adler Tag, "Before any invasion can be mounted against England, we must first destroy the RAF both in the air and on the ground." This was the whole concept of the task given to Göring, to eliminate the British Royal Air Force.

Finally, the on again, off again "Operation Sealion" was at last given as September 17th, which again, if we want to be critical, should have been September 19th if Hitler estimated that it would take five days of preparation. Orders were given for a full scale attack to be made prior to the lead up of the invasion, and again this was placed in the hands of Hermann Göring. An alternative date, as was mentioned earlier by the Führer could be given as September 27th. But is does seem that there was a chain of misleading events as shown above from the work by John Terraine.

1200hrs: The Germans do what they could in an attempt to jam the British radar with electronic interference. A few aircraft managed to cross the Channel on weather reconnaissance missions. One or two raiders bombed some of the coastal resorts in the vicinity of Eastbourne and Brighton where some sixty civilians were either killed our seriously hurt. A small formation was detected over Selsey Bill and one German aircraft is reported to have been shot down. Others probed the areas of South London and bombs fell on residential areas of Croydon and Mitcham killing over fifty people.

1515hrs: German raiders were detected crossing the coast at both the Thames Estuary and in the Deal and Folkestone areas. Bf109s escorting Do17s, He111 and Ju88 bombers. The enemy strength did not exceed 100 in both areas and a mini aerial combat session developed within 30  minutes.

1545hrs: Again, as was becoming a common occurrence, people along the coastal stretches from Folkestone, round 'Hell Corner' to Margate saw the twisting and snaking black dots against the grey overcast with many cheered if they recognised a German plane spiral down into the sea.

Park had reshuffled a number of his squadrons during the lull of the last few days so that Hurricanes and Spitfires could work in pairs. With most of the German raids following a similar pattern whenever crossing the Channel on a bombing mission, Park was now better prepared than ever for any raid coming in from the Thames Estuary or over the Channel between Dungeness and Ramsgate. This, coupled with the fact that most aerodromes had now been repaired and were 95% operational, radar stations were all back to normal, and all telephone lines connecting the radar stations, Observer Corps, Fighter Command HQ and 11 Group HQ were all repaired and functioning properly.

Vectored to the Thames Estuary were 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires), 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and 1RCAF Northolt (Hurricanes).

Vectored to the Kent coast near Deal were 72 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 229 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes).

1600hrs: Most of the action took place over the Estuary or over north Kent near Maidstone by the time that the British fighters made contact with the enemy. Even though the raids were small by previous standards, it was noticed that there were more Bf109s than usual indicating that the Luftwaffe were trying to draw as many fighters in the air as possible. A number of Do17s were shot down but also quite a few Bf109s also suffered. I/KGr.606 was to suffer most when two Dorniers were classed as write offs, while two others were damaged.

For Fighter Command, 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) was to suffer most after losing three aircraft and four others were damaged but were repairable, but only one pilot was killed. There were casualties amongst other squadrons.