1. The fighter escort defences of our Stuka
formations must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuka operations. It appears necessary to allocate three fighter Gruppen to each Stuka Gruppe,
one of these fighter Gruppen remains with the Stukas, and dives with them
to the attack; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude
and engages the fighter defences; the third protects the whole attack from
above. It will also be necessary to escort Stukas returning from the attack
over the Channel.
2. Night attacks on shipping targets are only
fruitful when the night is so clear that careful aim can be taken.
3. More importance must be attached to co-operation
are not to be broken up except in cases of
4. The incident of VILGI on August 13 shows
that certain unit commanders have not yet learnt the importance of clear
5. 1 have repeatedly given orders that twin-engined
fighters are only to be employed where the range of other
fighters is inadequate, or where it is for
the purpose of assisting our single-engined aircraft to break off combat.
Our stocks of twin-engined fighters are not
great, and we must use them as economically as possible.
6. Until further orders, operations are to
be directed exclusively against the enemy Air Force, including the
targets of the enemy aircraft industry allocated
to the different Luftflotten. Shipping targets, and particularly large
naval vessels, are only to be attacked where circumstances are especially
propitious. For the moment, other targets should be ignored. We must concentrate
our efforts on the destruction of the enemy Air Forces. Our night attacks
are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and
population shall be allowed no respite.
Even these, however, should where possible
be directed against Air Force targets.
7. My orders regarding the carrying out of
attacks by single aircraft under cover of cloud conditions have apparently
not been correctly understood. Where on one afternoon 50 aircraft are despatched
without adequate preparation on individual missions, it is probable that
the operation will be unsuccessful and very costly. I therefore repeat
that such sorties are to be undertaken only by specially selected volunteer
crews, who have made a prolonged and intensive study of the target, the
most suitable method of attack, and the particular navigational problems
involved. By no means all our crews are qualified to undertake such tasks.
8. KGr100 (bombers) is also in future to operate
against the enemy Air Force and aircraft industry.
9. It is doubtful if there is any point in
continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one
of those attacked has so far been put out of operation.
10. The systematic designation of alternative
targets would appear frequently to lead to certain targets being attacked
which have absolutely no connection with our strategic aims. It must therefore
be achieved that even alternative targets are of importance in the battle
against the enemy Air Force.
11. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Luftflotten
are to report to me on the question of the warnings to be given
during enemy air penetrations over the Reich.
At present, the warnings are causing a loss of output whose consequences are far graver than those caused
by the actual bomb damage. In addition, the frequent air raid warnings
leading to nervousness and strain among the
population of Western Germany. On the other hand, we must take into account
the risk of heavy loss of life should an attack be launched before a warning
has been given.
REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GORING
KARINHALL, AUGUST 15, 1940