It is a well known fact that most of the combat action of defending Fighter Command against the attacking forces of the Luftwaffe took place within the boundaries of 11 Group controlled by AVM Keith Park. On numerous occasions they were stretched to the limit, and often they would call in reinforcements from 12 Group controlled by AVM Leigh-Mallory. many of 12 Groups pilots were more than eager to fly down south and "get a slice of the action", and one of these men was none other than squadron commander of 242 Squadron based at Coltishall, Douglas Bader.

He spoke of his squadrons most successful day, August 30th 1940. Scrambled, they were vectored to a position near North Weald. After despatching one flight to investigate a reported enemy sighting, Bader and his squadron continued and later saw a large formation of about 80 bombers with about 30 Bf110 fighter bombers behind and above. There was no fighter escort. Bader ordered the squadron to attack, no special orders, they had position and height and the quickest and shortest method was in a straight line from where they were.

Bader and 242 Squadron showed no mercy, one by one HeIII and Bf110 aircraft were falling out of the sky. One squadron of Hurricanes had forced most of the 100+ enemy aircraft to return less the dozen that had been shot down. The patrol had been a success as every Hurricane returned to base without a scratch. Douglas Bader stated to AVM Leigh-Mallory that he had achieved this because they had been scrambled early. This gave them time to form and gain height. Bader told Leigh-Mallory that if he had more squadrons with him, he would have destroyed a greater number. "If I had more aeroplanes we would have shot down a whole lot more. If we could do this and were given time to form up, gain height as quickly as possible, we could attack in larger numbers and more enemy aircraft would be destroyed" he said.

In principal, Leigh-Mallory, supported by Duxford station commander "Woody" Woodhall agreed that Bader's idea of multiple squadrons attacking as a 'wing' would have a greater impact than separate squadrons each becoming involved in their own methods of attack. Three days later, LM called in Douglas Bader and informed him that the idea of a "Big Wing" was 'very feasible' and that he (S/L Bader) would have three days in which to perfect the "Big Wing" theory. Bader was told that the "Big Wing" would include three squadrons, 242 and 310 flying Hurricanes and 19 squadron based at nearby Fowlmere flying Spitfires. The 'Wing' would be under the command of S/L Douglas Bader. Success during practice varied, forming up soon after take off was the main problem. Often forming up was achieved far too late, often 19 Squadron could not even find the other two squadrons. But Bader insisted to LM that there was a marked improvement and that he knew that by the time they were called into action everything would be alright.

It was on September 7th that the Luftwaffe launched a full scale attack on London itself after the previous few days had struck hard at the aerodromes of Fighter Command. The first reports from the radar stations just prior to 1600hrs was 20+, then moments later this was amended to 50+, then 100+. It was estimated that over a thousand bombers, fighter bombers and their Bf109 escorts were heading towards London. AVM Park pulled out every available squadron that he had within 11 Group. Knowing that this would leave his sector stations around London unprotected, he called on 12 Group for assistance mainly to give protection to the sector stations that were protecting London while all 11 Group squadrons were called to combat action.

The "Big Wing" was ordered to patrol North Weald, but arrived late. Douglas Bader himself acknowledged the fact that they had been slow to form up and that for most of the flight to the patrol area they had become disjointed. But even so, the "Big Wing" was to claim 11 enemy aircraft destroyed for the loss on one of their own. Bader stated that he was disappointed with the result and that under the task that was expected of them the operation was a failure. LM did not see it that way, he was interested only in numbers and results and saw the operation as a victory for the "Big Wing". As for AVM Park, the fact that 12 Group (The "Big Wing") did not provide protection for North Weald as instructed but went in search for action elsewhere did not please him at all.

On September 9th more squadrons were allocated to the "Big Wing" and again AVM Park called on them to protect 11 Group airfields. The result was practically a carbon copy of September 7th. When the Luftwaffe staged the biggest attack of the entire Battle of Britain period on September 15th again Douglas Bader's "Big Wing" failed to protect North Weald and Hornchurch and was busy destroying enemy aircraft over Canterbury and Maidstone. This is borne out by the records stating that 19 Squadron lost two aircraft, one over Maidstone and the other force landed on the French coast. 242 Squadron lost one Hurricane over the Channel and two were damaged over London and Maidstone, while 310 squadron lost two aircraft over the Thames Estuary.

So, where they ordered to patrol North Weald and Hornchurch. Douglas Bader states that he was vectored to intercept the enemy over the Thames Estuary which is where he led the "Big Wing" to as ordered. AVM Park maintains, according to Vincent Orange in his book that 12 Group again was order to patrol North Weald and Hornchurch while 11 Group fighters were engaging the enemy over Kent and the Channel coast. John Frayn Turner in his book on the battle show that for once they had been scrambled on time and that they sped south to patrol the area between the River Thames and Gravesend.

So far we have looked at 12 Group and how the "Big Wing" functioned. It does appear that Bader often disregarded orders, or so we are led to believe, but then that depends on which history books one is reading. But disregarding orders or not, the records indicate that he achieved results. So what about statistics. According to 12 Group records, up until September 17th 1940 the "Big Wings" that had been despatched to assist 11 Group since September 3rd 1940 had resulted in 165 claims. The original formation of three squadrons had by now been increased to five so as to create maximum impact on the enemy. There has been very few problems with the functioning of the Duxford Wing and considering the results achieved and that there is absolutely no reason as to why the 'Wing' should not continue.

Douglas Bader, speaking after wars end, said of the "Big Wing", "As soon as LM gave the all clear that the wing be formed, my squadron 242, the 310 Czech Squadron and 19 Squadron from Fowlmere began practising with no problems at all. The method of operation was uncomplicated and there was no joining up over the airfield'. The Hurricanes flew in line astern while the Spitfires of 19 squadron between three and four thousand feet above, behind and to one side. The intention was that the Hurricanes would attack the bombers while the Spitfires with their better performance would hold off the Bf109s." The 'Wing' claimed Bader, never took more than six minutes to leave the ground and frequently were off in four minutes. Thus twenty minutes after take off the Hurricanes were over the estuary at 20,000 feet' with the Spitfires three to four thousand feet above.

Of September 7th, Bader stated that there was no more difficulty in controlling three squadrons than in controlling one. All the squadrons were on the same radio frequency and after 'an occasional word' to the other squadron commanders, my intentions were given. Any suggestion that the Wing was clumsy in operations are utter nonsense and completely without foundation, as was proved by fighter Wing operations over France in 1941. ACM Hugh Dowding and AVM Keith Park did not share Bader's and LM's view of the "Big Wing".

Dowding and Park were strong advocates of Air Ministry "Fighter Tactics in Combat'. That is, that all squadrons would be independent of each other and each would be controlled by their own sector controller until the actual time that a squadron commander would engage combat procedure when he would then take over. Individual squadrons could be best vectored to ideal positions in which to engage the enemy. These tactics may well have worked for the RFC in 1918, but in air warfare of WWII faster fighters and larger numbers of enemy bombers were creating a far different scenario. Up until late August Fighter Command did not have the number of fighters available to create a formidable wall of defence. Many advocates of Dowding and Park state that because of the shortage of pilots and aircraft the C-in-C and the 11 Group commander were right in their thinking. Large numbers of 'Wings' required a grater number of aircraft. Some members of the Air Ministry saw it that way as well.

Park and Leigh-Mallory often got caught up in verbal slanging matches especially at official meetings, so it was a well known fact that their was no love lost between them. Park always accused LM of the late arrival of his 'so called Big Wings', "...they cannot form up in time and on the odd occasion that they do they go searching the countryside for action. They cannot even obey orders." Park stated. LM would retaliate by saying that his squadrons were being of not much help if they were needlessly circling around 11 Group airfields when they could be destroying enemy aircraft elsewhere. Park also made it known that radio communication with the R/T sets that were being used were definitely not suitable (The VHF sets that were introduced in late September 1940 were far superior for this purpose) and presented numerous problems.

But even though Park did not favour "Big Wings" (Maybe because LM and Bader had come up with the idea first) in the later stages of the Battle of Britain he did approve of squadrons forming in pairs, and often pairs would be instructed to fly together. Four squadrons brought in to patrol or attack......not far short of being called a "Big Wing" as introduced by LM. Later on after the Battle of Britain, Wings were introduced. This was possibly due to the fact that Dowding and Park had been sacked from their positions and LM got the chance that he had always wanted in 11 Group. You will notice that that especially in post 1940 years most air warfare books do not relate to squadrons as being attached to aerodromes but rather wings, such as the Tangmere Wing and the Biggin Hill Wing.

It is interesting to note some of the statements made by S/L Douglas Bader, the instigator of the "Big Wing Theory" regarding his C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding and the 11 Group commander AVM Keith Park. Bader had high regards for his C-in-C and said that his commanders greatest contributions to the Battle of Britain was the fact that he had great faith in radar and that he pushed for its perfection. The other was his refusal to send additional aircraft to France when requested by Churchill. Bader felt that Dowding took far to much notice of Park and generally always agreed with Parks' decisions and that air defence was being arranged by 11 Group and not by Fighter Command. Bader further stated that the 'front line should have been embraced by the whole of Fighter Command and not just 11 Group". Bader firmly believed that Dowding's failure as a commander of Fighter Command was possibly caused by the pressure of his work, so much so that he was unaware aware of the changing circumstances of the 'battle'.