The Importance of
September 15th 1940
There were two contrasting extremes
on Sunday September 15th 1940. The first was that, thanks to the change
of tactics by Germany on September 7th to move its attacks away from Fighter
Command airfields and bomb cities and factories, notably London as the
principle target, gave Keith Park and Hugh Dowding the breathing space
that they needed. Fighter Command aircrew were rested by September 15th,
and many of the squadrons especially those that had been depleted by earlier
actions, had received replacement aircraft that not only brought 11 Group
up to strength, but 10 and 12 Groups as well.
By contrast, the Luftwaffe, again
concentrating its attacks on the British capital decided that an all out
daylight series of raids should decimate Britain and bring them to their
knees. The first mistake was that the Luftwaffe did not in any way attempt
to destroy the radar stations along the south coast of England before the
commencement of the raids. These were the eyes of Britain's war, so when
the huge armada of bombers congregated in the Calais area, they were doing
so in full view of Fighter Command. Then, once the raids commenced, they
took the same flight paths that they had taken on just about every other
occasion that they had on numerous times before. Hence, Fighter Command
was waiting.
Then they flew in a number of different
formations, one behind the other like one huge column coming across the
Channel between Dover and Dungeness. If they had placed these formations
say, side by side, maybe staggered, then come across the Channel on a hundred
mile front instead of a thirty mile front, then also have another formation
as part of the armada than branch off towards Portland before reaching
the coast, then this would have kept 10 Group busy in such a way that they
could not have given support to 11 Group.
In the lead up to the 15th, Wood
and Dempster inform us:
To
the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated,
and they felt that in the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse.
This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via
the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was
approaching.
And so it was,
to the Germans anyway. The day set down as this "hour of destiny" was to
be September 15th. This was to be the prelude to the invasion, which was
what the Battle of Britain was all about anyway. If the words of Wood and
Dempster shown above are to be agreed upon, then we must also look at their
opposition. Could it be said that the pilots of Fighter Command were scrappy
and uncoordinated. Not taking any individual pilots perspective into account,
but reading the general feeling of most pilots, was that squadron performance
greatly depended on leadership. The station commanders and the squadron
leaders, the men that guided them into battle.
Hough and
Richard's give two excellent accounts of this leadership:
Some
200 of the surviving fighter pilots commented on the quality of leadership
almost fifty years later. The answers varied widely, the great majority
being satisfied and in most cases greatly admiring of their COs. Others
experienced a bewildering succession of COs and there were undoubtedly
exceptions to the general excellence. One Australian, with an exceptionally
fine record, lost his first CO at Dunkirk, and there were five more before
the end. One he described simply as ‘mad’; another who was posted away
was not missed — ‘the best thing that ever happened to us’. Another was
‘a disaster’ and lasted two days. The final one ‘was completely without
experience and took us to 15,000 feet on 15th September of all days when
we had been ordered to 25,000. We had no real leaders from the time the
squadron was formed until the end.’
Another
Australian commented unfavourably on the hierarchy. ‘Leigh-Mallory was
a leader with no understanding of flying fast fighters and he was quite
hopeless in his selection of squadron commanders.’ As for his own CO, ‘he
should never have been given command of a fighter
squadron. He had flown into a tree landing on his first and only night
flight in a Spitfire.’
Hough &
Richard's The Battle of Britain - A Jubilee History 1989 p287
With good leadership,
squadrons did perform better, and, as described above, some squadrons had
to perform under the most atrocious conditions, but they succeeded in the
best way that they possibly could. On the other had, there was also a great
deal of contentment, as Hough & Richard's describe the feelings and
experiences of James Leathart, the 'professor' of 54 Squadron:
Leathart
recalled how the circumstances of the Battle obliged him to work from three
bases, his assigned, regular base at Hornchurch, the satellite at Rochford
and the forward base at Manston: ‘At Hornchurch I had an office, at Rochford
a corner of the mess table, at Manston nothing. There was a great deal
of admin. work, writing to the bereaved, fixing problems about, say, the
maintenance of aircraft, trouble with the Merlin's and so on.
‘I was immensely
helped at Hornchurch by the station CO “Daddy” Bouchier [Group Captain
Cecil Arthur Bouchier OBE, DFC] — a marvellous man. Pat Shallard, our I.O
[intelligence officer] was a great help, too. I had to compile squadron
reports with Pat at least twice a week. Then all claims of victories had
to be dealt with Pat, and then Group took about a week to confirm
or otherwise.
‘The adjutant
was a great support through all this, too. But the heaviest duty of all
was dealing with new pilots. These varied widely. Some showed immediate
promise, others couldn't even fly properly.........Squadron loyalty was
not something that usually had to be cultivated, though to a degree it
depended on the quality of the CO. Leathart recalled: ‘We all lived in
our tight little squadron worlds and hardly ever saw anyone outside, not
even our chums. We were totally dedicated to what we were doing, and at
the time it is true to say that we were more loyal to the reputation of
the squadron than we felt loyalty to our country. Of course that narrow
view changed later, but it was how we felt at the time.’
Hough &
Richard's The Battle of Britain - A Jubilee History 1989 pp285-6
In view of all
this, Fighter Command had to contend with bomber formations with their
close escorts plus the fact that almost twice as many enemy fighters may
have been flying as top cover. The Luftwaffe on the other hand, all they
had to do was to contend with the British fighters. And the odds; in most
cases it was between three and five to one in favour of the Luftwaffe.
Then, if we take a look at the total of daily victories, up until the 15th,
there was only four occasions where British casualties exceeded the British.
So it is hard
to believe that the pilots of Fighter Command were disorganized, scrappy
and uncoordinated. If there was any disorganization or lack of coordination,
it was within the ranks of the German hierarchy, where it has been said
that there were too many chiefs and a lot more bewildered Indians. The
Luftwaffe could not win this air war by using the same flight paths, the
same tactics, and on many occasions forgetting to send escorts to cover
bombers on many of the raids.
So, by September
15th, Fighter Command was in fact a far stronger force than the German
High Command was to appreciate. Keith Park had fresh pilots, squadrons
now at almost full strength and all of them well positioned at Sector Stations,
satellite stations and at forward airfields. They lay in waiting for a
Luftwaffe that was still at sixes and sevens. Hitler wanted London bombed
once and for all, and ordered Goring to mass the largest contingent of
bombers ever assembled to participate in the first daylight raid for a
week, to flatten London in preparation to the invasion (Operation Sealion)
which it was planned would take place two days later. Goring on the other
hand still wanted to attack Fighter Command airfields, factories and anything
else that would destroy the RAF. What happened on this important day is
summed up by John Terraine:
If
15th August showed the German High Command that air supremacy was not to
be won within a brief space, 15th September went far to convince them that
it would not be won at all.
Official
History (Collier) op. cit. p242
It was a day
in marked contrast to September 7. For Fighter Command, on the 15th, just
about everything went right. Despite ominous signs, a few days earlier,
of successful German jamming, the radar screen gave full warning of the
coming attacks:
The stupidity
of large formations sorting themselves out in full view of British radar
was not yet realized by the Luftwaffe.
Wood &
Dempster op. cit. p231
Astonishing
— but, on this day at least, apparently true; better still, on the 15th
there were no feints to distract the operators and worry the filter rooms.
Park was able to alert his squadrons to give the enemy a warm reception
the moment they crossed the coast. With 17 squadrons (11 of No. 11 Group,
one of No. 10, and the five of the “Duxford Wing”) opposing it, the first
German formation was harried all the way to London, causing many bombers
simply to unload at random — which did not, of course, prevent much damage
being done, including two bombs on Buckingham Palace. Göring promptly
ordered a second attack, to be pressed home with all energy.
His signal
was duly picked up and this was an occasion when the speed of the Ultra
operation and the direct line to Dowding made history.
Winterbotham
op. cit. pp 58-9
John Terraine
The
Right Of The Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p211
The War Cabinet
as well as the British Government had known for a long time that it was
Hitler's intention to make an invasion of Great Britain. It was also a
well known fact, that for any such invasion to take place, the Luftwaffe
had to clear the air of Royal Air Force fighter aircraft that would endanger
the crossing of the Channel by German troops and hundreds of naval barges,
as well as tanks, military vehicles and other hardware. This was what the
Battle of Britain was all about.
Contrary to
the claim that the British placed their faith in decoded messages intercepted
from the Germans by the captured German 'Enigma' machine, nothing could
be farther from the truth. True, messages were decoded, the first being
during the Dunkirk operations, but normally, by the time the messages had
been decoded, the event in question had passed and was really of little
value. In 1940, Ultra was in its infancy, it really did not come into its
own until about 1943. It must be realised that important messages and orders
were generally sent by land line by teleprinter. One of the messages
of importance that was valuable, was the decoding of Hitler's directive
where it made mention of "Seelowe" or Sealion. British Intelligence took
no time in working out what Sealion was. "Sea" meaning water or a sea,
and "lion" could mean nothing else but Britain. The Operation Sealion was
'across the sea to Britain'. The question was......when. But the message
did not come from Hitler, it was actually accidentally sent by Goring himself:
The
Directive was so secret that it was sent only to the Commanders in Chief.
But Goring passed it on to his Air Fleet commanders, and did so by radio.
To put such a important message on the air was an unnecessary risk but
the Germans had great confidence in their coding machines. At all levels
of command, the Luftwaffe used the Enigma coding machine, at this time
changing keys two or three times each day. The Enigma was a small battery-powered
machine not unlike a portable typewriter. Rotors changed the cipher, and
the receiving machine lit up each letter. This was then written down by
one of the code clerks.
.........Only
rarely, as with this foolish risk taken with Directive No.16, did the Enigma
intelligence pay such a dividend. It gave the British the German code word
"Sea-lion" and was a shot in the arm for the code breakers.
Len Deighton
Fighter
Pimlico 1977 p28
As early as August,
"Ultra" began to mention Adlertag and Adlerangriff, but these meant little
at that stage, except that some new development was being planned. On many
occasions, it was only when the Royal Air Force "Y" Service picked up German
R/T transmissions, that they knew that something was building. Employed
at these intelligence stations at Cheadle in Cheshire and at Kingsdown
in Kent (it was moved back from Hawkinge) were men who could speak and
understand German. They listened for vital words or sentences that would
give the RAF a clue as to what may be happening in the next twenty-four
hours. In some cases, they were even given dates!!
Dowding and
Park knew that, as the battle moved into September, if Germany was to carry
out an invasion, they would have to do it soon. Summer was now past, the
weather conditions would soon deteriorate and the days were to become shorter.
Intercepted messages that had been picked up indicated that September 12th
was the most likely date, but this came and went. But it caused Park to
make preparations anyway. He moved his squadrons to where they could best
be utilised, and whatever date that would be chosen, Fighter Command was
ready.
Now, it was
believed that September 14th would be the date of the last all out bombing
raid that would precede the invasion. But again, there was no sign that
this was to take place. When word got through to Fighter Command that a
huge build up was forming over Calais on the morning of September 15th,
they knew then, that this was the day that the messages were trying to
tell them, and really, they had been caught by surprise. But the German
bomber crews took considerable time to form up over the French coast, and
this gave Keith Park the time he needed to prepare for the defence of what
was to become the last opportunity for the Luftwaffe to destroy as much
of Britain, the Royal Air Force and the peoples morale before the commencement
of an invasion planned for two days later.
Dowding and
Park, Churchill, the War Cabinet and the Government knew that this was
going to be the most decisive point in the battle. Should Fighter Command
lose this vital round, they way would be open for invasion. It has been
stated, so it will not be said again, that Germany and its decision maker
were their own worst enemy in the lead up to September 15th. The decision
to turn attentions to London, was the biggest mistake of the war and cost
Germany victory in the Battle of Britain. Fighter Command, was ready and
waiting.
Pages 41 and 42 tells us the great fight that was put up by all areas of Fighter Command, from ground crews to pilots, from radar and observers to the intelligence units.
But the determination and courage of the pilots of Fighter Command must
have had the greatest impact on this decisive victory. So important was
victory on September 15th, was that if the result had gone the other way,
Britain would have opened the door to Germany, and Adolf Hitler would
have been able to walk down the paved sidewalk of Whitehall.
John Terraine
sums up the conclusion to the purpose of September 15th perfectly:
Two
days later, on September 17, Ultra spoke with perfect clarity: a signal
was intercepted from the German General Staff to the officer responsible
for the loading and turn-round of supply and troop-carrying aircraft in
Holland. It authorized the dismantling of the air-loading equipment on
the Dutch aerodromes; and without the air-loading equipment there could
be no invasion. The signal, with appropriate gloss, was sent to the Prime
Minister immediately, and it was discussed at the Chiefs of Staff Committee
that evening. Churchill asked the Chief of the Air Staff to explain it:
Cyril Newall
had been well briefed; he gave it as his considered opinion that this marked
the end of SEALION, at least for this year ... There was a very broad smile
on Churchill's face now as he lit up his massive cigar and suggested that
we should all take a little fresh air.
John Terraine
The
Right Of The Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p212
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