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WEATHER:
Much improved
conditions would prevail throughout the British Isles. Temperatures should
be slightly higher than the previous days and conditions are expected to
remain fine with cloud periods in all Channel areas.
OPERATIONS:
This day, Germany
launched a total of 1,310 sorties against Britain. It appeared that Kesselring
was intent on attacking with everything that he had. One direct hit on
the power supply line took out the radar stations at Dover, Rye, Pevensey,
Foreness, Beachy Head and Whitstable and they were off the air for
a critical three hours. Biggin Hill was attacked twice by 109s and Ju88s
within a few hours and major damage was done with the result that some
40 people were killed. Kenley, Shoreham, Tangmere and Rochford were also
targeted where the story was much the same. Hangars, buildings and the
airfields themselves receiving devastating damage.
Many times, fighter sweeps by Bf109s failed to attract Fighter Command into the air, Park was not going to be drawn into unnecessary fighter combat. So Kesselring sent over fast Ju88 bombers and working in conjunction with the Bf109s was adamant that somehow he would get the RAF fighters into the air. At one time, a mass formation of over 200 bombers droned over the Kent coast only to break into separate formations with each one targeting the RAF airfields. Biggin Hill was attacked again, as was Kenley, Gravesend, Hornchurch, Debden, North Weald, in fact every RAF airfield from Duxford to the south coast was attacked in one way or another. Fighter Command was forced to get some of its fighters into the air. The selective targets were to 'get the bombers'. The skies over the south coast became a pattern of vapour trails as some of the RAF fighters got tangled up with 109s, it was impossible to avoid them. Most of the fighters tried in vain to straffe the bombers, but it all became a melee of all sorts. The casualties started to fall from the sky, Spitfires, Bf 109s, Hurricanes, Heinkels and Dorniers. Many were badly shot up, others just collided into each other.
Deliberate, or accidental, the ramming
and/or colliding with aircraft was a common occurrence, especially when
many of the pilots were adopting the head on attack attitude. Carried out
correctly, it was a successful method of attack. Mostly used on attack
on bombers, it was also used frequently in fighter combat.
Despite the fine
weather of the morning period, the only raids were on shipping in the Thames
Estuary. These shipping strikes had been left alone for the last couple
of weeks and Fighter Command regarded them as once again being lures to
attract RAF fighters into the air. Park was in no way going to be tempted,
sending up squadrons of fighters would weaken his defences of his airfields
that seemed to be the targets of enemy action of the last few days. The
first sign of action took place during mid-morning.
OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
1030hrs:
First sign of activity occurred when a formation was picked up off the coast
near Cap Griz Nez. Three separate groups were detected which
turned out to be separate formations of He111s and in all totalled about
120 aircraft. The cloud base was down to about 7,000 feet and the Observer
Corps had difficulty in estimating their numbers as the German formation
was flying at about 14,000 to 15,000 feet, and reported a small escort
of Bf109s. The Luftwaffe were now, for the first time using a smaller number
of Bf109s as close escort, and with a larger number flying at about 25,000
feet.
1050hrs: 43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes), 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), 111 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 603 Squadron Hornchurch Spitfires), 610 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) and 616 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires) were released by Fighter Command cope with the incoming formations. Park dispatched his squadrons in two waves, as the German bombers were coming across the Channel in three separate formations. 43, 79, 253, and 603 Squadrons went in first to intercept the first wave of bombers just prior to them reaching the English coast between Deal and Folkestone. 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) met up with the leading Heinkels and decided on a head on attack. This was a manoeuvre that AVM Hugh Dowding did not agree with, stating that it was far too dangerous and that many of the more novice pilots would want to copy their more experienced counterparts with possible fatal results. But nevertheless, squadron commanders generally encouraged it, because performed properly, it allowed the bomber formation to scatter in all directions, while at the same time a squadron following would then attack the bombers while they were pre-occupied with avoiding hitting the first squadron that caused them to scatter in the first place. South African pilot, Pilot Officer E.J. Morris went into a head on attack with a Heinkel. He knew this form of attack although he himself had never tried it. 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes) engaged a formation of Heinkel 111s and while some peeled of to execute their attack from above, many decided to make a head on attack. Morris was one of them. He pressed the firing button, banked sharply only for the Heinkel to ram the underbelly of his Hurricane. His aircraft was cut to pieces, but Morris, still strapped in his seat managed to pull the ripcord and parachuted to safety. His injuries were just a broken leg...and a bit of confidence. He said afterwards, "I thought they were supposed to break formation if we pressed home a frontal attack". He was told that '...not if the pilot is dead, you are supposed to make allowances for that'. Morris replied, "Then how the hell are you supposed to know if he is dead or not?" The way you did, he was politely told. S/L Tom Gleave of 253 Squadron was another who saw action this day. At 32 years of age, Gleave wanted to command the squadron, but was told politely that RAF regulations did not permit commanding officers above the age of 26. But somehow, Tom Gleave managed to get part of his way by smooth talking his way into sharing the command with the newly appointed commanding officer. It seemed that this day Tom Gleave was 'Hun Hungry';
Afterwards Tom
Gleave learned of the RAF hierarchy "Bullshit" for want of a better word
as he calls it. When he made his claim for the four Bf109s, they stated
that it was an impossibility to shoot them down in as many minutes. As
a compromise, they allowed his claim as four probables.
1115hrs: Observer Corps further reported that 40 plus Heinkel He111s and 30 Do17s escorted by 100 plus Bf109s and Bf110s were approaching the coast. By now, the first wave over bombers had pushed on over Ashford still in combat with the British fighters. With the first wave of He110s and Do17s crossing the Kent coast, what radar was working was picking up sightings that stretched right back to the French coast. Keith Park at Fighter Command Group HQ decides to act, and places nearly sixteen squadrons at readiness with two squadrons from 12 Group sent in to give cover to Biggin Hill and Kenley. 1130hrs: One of the first squadrons to intercept the enemy formation is 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes). Green section and Blue section move in to attack the Heinkel's:
1145hrs: The second wave of German
bombers and their Bf109 escorts were now entangled with more RAF fighters.
85, 111, 222 and 616 Squadrons, just like the first squadrons to engage
the bombers they were to have their hands full. Keith Park now had to act,
and dispersed sixteen squadrons. But by the time that they managed to take
off and gain height, the German bomber formation was well over Kent and
heading towards London. The He111s and the Do17s break into two formations,
and once again Park is quick to realize that his Sector Stations are under
attack once more. One eyewitness said of this day, that no matter where
you looked over Kent, Surrey or South London, you could see nothing but
bombers and fighter planes fighting it out. Vapour trails were everywhere
and it was believed that Germany had sent over the whole dammed Luftwaffe.
S/Ldr Tom Gleave of 253 Squadron achieved the remarkable feat of destroying
four Me109s in just a matter of minutes.
1200hrs: With squadrons engaging the first wave of bombers, and also the second wave, reports were still coming in to Fighter Command that more formations were over the Channel and heading for the Kent coast. Park had no option but to put all his squadrons into the air. Two squadrons that had been covering Biggin Hill were moved forward into the attack, and Park called on 12 Group to send squadrons down covering Biggin Hill and Kenley. 1215hrs: Once again, Biggin Hill was hit, the two squadrons from 12 Group fail to sight the Ju88s coming in from the south, but only few of the bombs actually fall on the airfields doing damage to a hangar and putting the telephone system out of action. Many of the bombs fall wide and the town of Biggin Hill suffered as did the village of Keston. Kenley suffered much the same fate with many buildings hit and many stationery wounded aircraft on the ground received further damage. 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes) along with 74 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) are pulled back to guard the aerodromes of Biggin and Kenley because once again, the 12 Group squadrons had failed to show. Two sections of Hurricanes try to keep the Bf109s occupied, while two sections engage the bombers. One Hurricane is lost as it fails to pull out of a dive on its target and collides with a He111 which goes down in flames. The pilot of the Hurricane was seen to bale out. 79 Squadron, as well as 610 Squadron, both from Biggin Hill between them, claim 10 enemy aircraft shot down. As well as Biggin Hill and Kenley suffering badly in the raid, the airfields of Croydon and Detling were also hit. 1300hrs: It had been one of Fighter Commands busier days, every squadron in 11 Group had at least been called up for one sortie. Again Keith Park was on the phone to 12 Group asking '...where in the hell were your fighters that were supposed to have protected my airfields." The answer was that the 12 Group fighters could not find the enemy, to which Park 'politely' told them that they were not supposed to be going looking for the enemy, they were supposed to be at the South London airfields waiting for the enemy to come to them. 1315hrs: Many of the original He111s, Do17s and Bf109s were heading for home, that is, if they hadn't been shot down, as another wave of bombers crossed the coast between Deal and Dungeness again. This time, their strength was much smaller. Coming in in three waves ten minutes apart, they all veered into different direction once over the Kent coastline heading for their own particular target. These attacked the forward airfields of Hawkinge and Manston. 43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) engaged the bombers and many of the British fighter pilots see the He113 fighter for the first time. Although the airfield received minor damage, all the bombers made just the single run before turning back over the Channel. F/L R.C. Reynell of 43 Squadron is caught between five He113 fighters who have the advantage of height. Reynell evades the German fighters with an extraordinary display of combat aerobatics with more manoeuvrable Hurricane, but because the German tactics was to send one He113 into a combat dive after Reynell's Hurricane, the others positioned themselves to block any exit Reynell may have had in mind. This cat and mouse action continued for eight to ten minutes before the enemy had to break off the engagement because of their fuel situation and return for home, and a relieved Reynell flies back to base. 1600hrs: More waves of heavy German bombers came across the Kent countryside and from the direction of the Thames Estuary. 56 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes), 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 501 Squadron Gravesend (Hurricanes) and 603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) were among the squadrons dispatched to intercept, many of these squadrons had been in combat practically non stop since 1030hrs. Now for the first time, as Keith Park for the second time this day had every one of his squadrons airborne, called in 12 Group and this time requested them to engage in combat and not just protect 11 Group airfields. One of the squadrons to be sent down in the combat area was 242 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes) led by S/L Douglas Bader who had just brought his squadron down from Coltishall that morning. Bader, had been longing for action for months, but up until now had not seen any, well, with the exception of intercepting a lone aircraft while on patrol, but according to Douglas Bader, "....that is not action, my twelve Hurricanes against fifteen or so of theirs, that's what I call action." So if Bader called fifteen enemy aircraft action, then he was now going to be thrown right into it, because, being vectored close to North Weald there were seventy enemy aircraft to be met. [ Document 40 ]. 1800hrs: For the second time that day, Biggin Hill was bombed and almost put out of action Detling airfield was the first to get hit by at least fifty H.E. bombs. Oil tanks were hit and set ablaze, the main electricity cable was hit and cut the power to all buildings and with hangars and roadways cratered it was anticipated that the airfield would be out of action for at least two days. Nine Ju88 bombers manage to get though the British defences and took everybody by surprise and struck Biggin Hill with a low level bombing attack dropping 1000 lb bombs causing mayhem. The transport yard was destroyed, storerooms, the armoury and both officers and sergeants messes were severely damaged, two hangars were wrecked earlier in the day and now another hanger was almost flattened, and on top of all that telephone and communication lines were severed, gas and water mains were ruptured. Casualties amounted to thirty-nine personnel killed and thirty five injured.
It had been a busy
day for Fighter Command, over 22 squadrons had been in action for most
of the day, many of them doing up to four sorties. But as night fell, there
was to be no let up. Göring this time had meant business. It appeared
that this was an all out effort to destroy Fighter Command in one way or
another.
130 plus Ju88s and He111s of Luftflotte 3 made a night attack on the City of Liverpool, Do17s and He111s made raids on London and Portsmouth, Manchester was bombed as was Worcester and Bristol. In another unexpected raid, the Vauxhall Motor Works at Luton was hit resulting in over fifty people being killed. It had been one of the worst days for the RAF, 39 aircraft were destroyed, eight of these were Spitfires from 222 Squadron Hornchurch, over 50 RAF personnel had been killed (39 of these at Biggin Hill) with nearly 30 seriously injured. Some 200 civilians had been killed in the air raids and along with the radar stations of Pevensey, Beachy head and Foreness sustaining damage, Biggin Hill was made virtually non-operational, and the control of its sector was transferred over to Hornchurch. On the German side, a total of 41 fighters and bombers had been destroyed. But they too, during the hours of darkness felt the brunt of an Bomber Command offensive as well. More that 80 Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys attack cities in Holland and Belgium. Berlin is attacked by 149 Squadron Bomber Command. 50 Squadron attacked oil refineries near Rotterdam. Of these, only four RAF bombers are lost. CASUALTIES:
SATURDAY AUGUST 31st 1940 WEATHER:
Fair conditions
were expected to prevail over most of the country with higher temperatures.
Clear and fine in the south with hazy conditions in the Thames Estuary
and Channel areas near Dover.
OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
It was now felt that the Luftwaffe
really now meant business. The forward airfields of Hawkinge, Lympne and
Manston had received considerable damage the day before, but they were
regarded as still being operational. The main airfields of Gravesend, Croydon,
Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and Duxford also had received serious damage.
Biggin Hill, who had the day before, made a statement that they were temporarily
out of action, but with an all out effort by the ground crews (and some
pilots) overnight and in the early hours of the morning, they declared
themselves operational.
Movements within Fighter Command were 610 Squadron (Spitfires) who had been operation out of Biggin Hill were transferred north to Acklington where it was hoped they would indulge in a well earned rest. 72 Squadron (Spitfires) under the command of S/Ldr A.R. Collins moved down from Acklington to Biggin Hill. 0755hrs: Radar picked up one plot over the Thames Estuary, another plot was picked up over the Channel and heading towards the Dover and Dungeness area and within a few minutes it was confirmed that three formations were approaching from the Thames Estuary while the fourth was approaching over Dover and many a remark was made, "...they just don't give up do they." and ".......blimey, not again." But Park, realizing that he had dispatched his fighters far too late the previous day, was taking no chances this time. Two squadrons were "scrambled" and were vectored to the Margate and Thames Estuary area. This first wave of enemy aircraft was identified as Bf109s and flying at some 25,000 feet where their performance was better than that of the Spitfire. Park sent out the order for them to return to their bases as he was not wanting to involve fighter to fighter combat. 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) received the message and headed for home. But the other squadron 1st Canadian Squadron RCAF (they had not been allocated a RAF Squadron number at this time) did not receive the message and got caught up with the Bf109s and three of their aircraft were destroyed. F/O G.C. Hyde baled out of his aircraft but sustained severe burns, F/Lt V.B. Corbett suffered the same fate. There is no information on the third Canadian pilot. Realizing that Fighter Command was not to be tempted, the Bf109s decided to attack the barrage balloons around the Dover area. 0815hrs: Three more waves of enemy aircraft had been detected by radar approaching the Thames Estuary again. The Observer Corps reported them to be a formation of 200+ enemy bombers, which consisted of a mixture of He111s and Do17s escorted by 60 Bf110s. Keith Park makes the decision to "scramble" 13 squadrons from 11 Group in the London area, leaving only two or three squadrons to guard the city. But reaching the mouth of the Thames, the German aircraft break and go into several formations, each heading for a separate target. North Weald was hit and sustained considerable damage, Hornchurch also received a few hits, the RAF fighters here doing a swell job at keeping most of the bombers away from the airfield. 0825hrs: A formation of 40 Do17s heads towards Duxford with the escorting Bf110s as protection. 12 Group is taken by surprise and the Group Controller there sends out an urgent appeal to 11 Group for assistance. Park responded immediately and diverted 111 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) to make an interception. 111 Squadron flew due north-east in an effort to cut off the formation, then turning south met the Dornier Do17s head on. They managed to scatter the formation but could only destroy only one bomber. With most of the RAF fighters holding the bombers at bay around the London area, and 111 Squadron already dispersing the other formation from attacking Duxford, it left a third formation completely unopposed at attacking Debden airfield which suffered badly where over 100 bombs fell causing serious damage to three barracks, storerooms and pot holing the airfield badly. 18 personnel were injured in this attack as well as a number of aircraft parked on the base. The returning Dorniers and Heinkels ran into 19 Squadron Fowlmere (Spitfires) where two enemy bombers are shot down at the expense of two of the Spitfires. One pilot, F/O J.B. Coward had his aircraft shot up by an Bf109 and had his leg torn off just below the knee, but he managed to bale out and was safely taken to a base hospital. 0900hrs, The Luftwaffe launch another attack, this time two waves approach from the Thames Estuary again. One Dornier formation diverts to Eastchurch where the airfield receives minor damage, as does Detling airfield which was attacked by Bf110s. By this time, Fighter Command was feeling the strain of many days of hard combat. Fighters were being lost in greater numbers than they were being replaced, but what was more important was the fact that the pilots were becoming tired. Many were going up on four sorties a day and at the moment with 11 Group under constant attack they were not in a position to be given the rest that was so badly needed. From Group Headquarters, AVM Keith Park issues another order further cementing the order that no fighter aircraft are to be sent to intercept formations where the Observer Corps have recognized the enemy as being only formations of German fighter aircraft. 1215hrs: 100 bombers with a heavy escort was detected coming across the coast at Dungeness. Breaking into two separate formations but both seemed to be taking different routes towards London. Confirmation comes through that one of the formations consists of Dornier Do17s while the other is made up of Heinkel He111 which also splits up into two more formations. In this attack, Biggin Hill is again attacked just after 79 Squadron (Hurricanes) is "scrambled". Hornchurch "scrambles" 603 Squadron (Spitfires) which had just recently come down from Scotland. Of the action over Hornchurch, Dennis Newton writes of an action of this combat:
79 Squadron Biggin
Hill (Spitfires) is ordered to patrol over Biggin Hill and to expect a
raid by Heinkels on the airfield again. This time they cannot get to the
bombers because of the strong cover by the fighter escort. Three Bf109s
are shot down, during the fierce combat but the bombers get through and
again Biggin Hill suffers considerably. The airfield was cratered
so badly that squadrons that had previously taken off there had to be diverted
to Kenley and Croydon. Now, all the telephone lines at Biggin Hill had
been put out of action.
The attack on Hornchurch continued. A squadron managed to take off before the approaching Dorniers dropped their first bombs, but three Spitfires didn't make it:
1300hrs:
During the afternoon, waves of Bf110s come over the coast from Cape Griz
Nez and attack the radar stations once again. Foreness CHL also came under
attack, but although damage was caused, it was not enough to put any of
them out of action and by nightfall, all radar stations were working as
normal. The Observer Corps report that some 150 plus enemy aircraft and
cross the coast between Dover and the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command were
to release 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes),
310 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes), 501 Squadron Gravesend (Hurricanes) and 601 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes). Squadron Leader Tom Gleave of 253 Squadron Kenley, who had the previous day shot down four enemy aircraft in as many minutes was now a casualty himself. When the squadron was scrambled, Tom Gleave led what was left of his squadron, just seven serviceable Hurricanes and attacked a formation of Ju88 bombers. He was just about to return to Kenley, when a Bf109 dived down behind him, then pulled up firing at the Hurricane. Gleaves machine was hit underneath the fuselage and in the tail section. Tom Gleave stated later that:
At the same time,
the reserve fuel tank which was between the instrument panel and the engine
burst into flames and some twenty-eight gallons of high octane fuel splashed
all over Tom Gleaves body. With his clothing alight, and flames licking
every part of the cockpit of the Hurricane, he rolled the aircraft over
on its back and managed to unbuckle his harness and fall out of the open
canopy which luckily was in the locked open position as he had been in
the process of preparing to land. With his clothes on fire, he chose not
to open his parachute in case the chute caught fire, and fell for at least
2,000 feet before deciding to pull the ripcord. His body had been badly
burned, so too his face. His eyelids had practically been melted together
and he was falling blind as he heard the closing sound of a Messerschmitt,
then the sound of the Merlin engine of a Spitfire followed by the rat-a
tat of Browning machine guns, and he knew he was safe as the Bf109 pulled
away. He landed in a wood, and with his eyelids now peeled open and his
trousers burnt away he saw that his legs had terrible burns with the skin
coming away like sheets of wafer thin pieces of paper. His gloves too had
been burnt off revealing a pair of skinless hands and blood-stained flesh.
1515hrs:
All available aircraft at Biggin Hill and Hornchurch are scrambled as another
large formation makes its way in from the Thames Estuary. Hornchurch receives
only slight damage and one of the personnel is reported killed. But as
it had been in the past, heavier attacks seemed more prevalent at Biggin
Hill where again the damage was more serious.
This same incident is mentioned in Dennis Newton's book: * Pilot Officer W. Millington 79 Squadron RAF Later that evening,
some 160 bombers again attacked the Merseyside cities of Liverpool and
Birkenhead, this being the fourth successive night of bombing. There were
a number of nuisance raids around the country. Duxford also was attacked,
but with no serious damage.
In all, it had been a terrible day for the RAF. Since first light, the airfields of 11 Group had been under relentless attack. But the already tired pilots were hanging out, and as one pilot had said, ".....this is about as bad as it can get, because after today, it just cannot get any worse." By evening, the sun went down closing another month and Fighter Command was taking a rather grim view of the situation. The last couple of days had taken a toll on pilots, including many experienced commanders and now many squadrons were being led by junior officers and even in some cases by non-commissioned officer pilots. Sgt J.H (Ginger) Lacey of 501 Squadron was one of them. S/L P.W. Townsend of 85 Squadron was another experienced pilot that was a casualty of the battle, his place being taken by P/O G. Allard. Sgt A.(Archie) McDowell had his moment of glory when he took command of 602 Squadron. 151 Squadron that had lost six pilots in three days was now down to twelve pilots to fly ten serviceable aircraft and was withdrawn from 11 Group duties. 43 Squadron lost two of its commanders and by early September a third, S/L C.B. Hull, a South African was killed. From now on, it seemed that the Royal Air Force was to rely heavily on the young and inexperienced pilots of Fighter Command. In all, the Germans had lost over sixty aircraft that had been shot down, and with most of them being fighters the amount of personnel killed, injured or taken prisoner was a serious blow to the Luftwaffe. The German pilots like the British were becoming tired, and by now disillusionment was setting in. They had been promised by German High Command that the attacks on the British Fighter Command would be a swift action, and that to knock them out in the air as well as on the ground would be nothing but a formality. But the Luftwaffe had found that this was not to be so, they felt that on many occasions they were being misinformed by their own intelligence service because they were constantly underestimating the strength both in pilots and aircraft of Fighter Command. They also felt that the RAFs strength as the war progressed was in the skill of the fighter pilot, the young British pilots were learning tactics fast. But, the number of losses in the Luftwaffe was now causing great concern, not only to the German High Command, but to the pilots themselves. [ Document 41 ] But even moving the Bf109s to Calais so that they could spend more time escorting the bombers was a good tactical move, it still did not allow them the amount of time over England as they would have liked. Buy the time that they had crossed the coast of England, and including take off, they had used up over a third of their fuel. If they had engaged in a dogfight and with throttles wide open excessive fuel would be used and this was one of the main reasons for having to break away and retreat from combat because they had to allow for enough fuel for the return journey. Many German fighters were shot down trying to get back to their bases because they could not afford to get involved in any more dogfights. They knew, that in the last couple of days in August 1940, they had pounded the RAF airfields almost to oblivion, and they were being given figures that indicated that they were destroying more and more RAF fighters every day, but each time that they went in on a mission escorting the bombers, there always seemed to be more Hurricanes and Spitfires than ever before. Many German fighter pilots had by now grown to "hate' the Channel, they started to call it the 'sewer' because any more time spent in combat than ten minutes, then they knew that a forced landing in the Channel was inevitable. But even if
they were tired and morale was at an all time low, they were to prove in
the month ahead that they still had enough strength to practically 'set
England alight' with constant day and night raids that would, as Goering
stated "for once and for all we will now pound them into submission".
CASUALTIES:
The above casualty list does really not reflect on the ferocity of the days fighting. In addition to those killed are: 41 Hurricanes and Spitfires either written off of lost at sea.
SUMMARY FOR AUGUST The first few days of the month were a continuation of the July raids by the Luftwaffe. The weather controlled most of the activities but the raids continued
on the Channel convoys. Hitler issued his famous Directive No.17 in which he stated that he has decided to wage war against Great Britain. The plan was that an all out air attack against Britain was planned for August 13th, but in the meantime the convoy attacks continued through until August 12th.
The day that "Adler Tag" was implemented, August 13th, got off to a clumsy start for the Luftwaffe. Some of the bomber formations had taken off before the actual order had reached their respective units. Some of these until managed to rendezvous with their fighter escort only to find that after a short period the fighters peeled away and returned to base. A communication breakdown had caused the bomber formations not to receive radio signals because the wrong frequency had been given to them. They continued their attack and a misunderstanding by British radar which advised of "a few bandits approaching" so only one fighter squadron was sent up. The Dorniers made a successful attack on Eastchurch aerodrome. The attacks on Fighter Command airfields was under way, although a large planned attack was supposed to have been made on the afternoon of the 13th, weather conditions did not permit this and Adler Tag was delayed.
Night activity was also increased by the Luftwaffe. Up until now they had been quite content with
mine laying operations. Now they were venturing further and with more purpose. Attacks commenced on
Merseyside, in the Midlands, and towns along the east coast. By August 15th, formations of bombers from Luftflotte 5 based at Stavanger in Norway attempted an attack on the north east of England with disastrous results, so much so that no further attempts were made to attack from Scandinavia again. But during the afternoon, radar
stations along the southern coast as well as Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston airfields. It was clear by August 15th, that the Luftwaffe plans were to make all out attacks on Fighter Command airfields.
By the 18th of the month, the Battle of Britain was on in earnest. Biggin Hill, Kenley and Croydon were almost devastated. Poling radar station was almost destroyed, Coastal Command and naval aerodromes suffered damage, as was many areas in north Kent. Casualty figures started to rise on both sides. Göring thought that he would have inflicted enough damage to Fighter Command that the way would be clear for
Hitler's planned invasion, but this was not to be so. They thought that this would be an easy victory, but after the days events, their moral lowered and such a high loss rate the invasion date was set back until September 17th.
Through until the end of the month, the Luftwaffe maintained its pressure on the RAF airfields. Hardly any of the aerodromes escaped severe bombing attacks. Fighter Command was losing pilots as well as aircraft, and Dowding acknowledged that he was losing pilots and aircraft quicker than they could be replaced. The Luftwaffe continued to make blunders that were to cost them more bombers as well as aircrew. They had not learned from earlier mistakes and a number of occasions saw fighter escorts ordered to turn back without notifying the bomber formations. Now Fighter Command were losing not only new and inexperienced pilots, they were losing pilots with many years experience and who held high rank. On a number of occasions junior officers were given command of squadrons because of the loss of squadron commanders.
R.A.F. Fighter Command
Spitfire: 113 destroyed, 40 damaged
Blenheim: 13 destroyed, 10 damaged
Defiant: 7 destroyed, 3 damaged
TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 344 destroyed, 97 damaged
The Luftwaffe
Heinkel He 111: 89 destroyed, 15 damaged
Junkers Ju 88: 89 destroyed, 32 damaged
Junkers Ju 87: 57 destroyed, 16 damaged
Messerschmitt Bf 109: 217 destroyed, 45 damaged
Messerschmitt Bf 110: 119 destroyed, 40 damaged
Other: 27 destroyed, 4 damaged
TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 669 destroyed, 182 damaged
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