Document-15.  


BOBHSOC


Air Intelligence
The Ears of Fighter Command

ENIGMA IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

A number of methods were used to intercept German messages, all of them becoming the "Ears of Fighter Command". The Royal Air Force relied very heavily on Intelligence reports, and it was these reports that described German troop and infantry movements as well as movements that were within the German Luftwaffe. Information regarding German movements and orders were made from at least four main sources. One of these was the Enigma machine. A highly sophisticated machine that was used by the Germans that used code to transmit secret messages, and the code was changed daily.

Where radar was the "Eyes" of Fighter Command, assisting them to see out beyond the coastline and accurately pinpoint formations of enemy aircraft over one hundred miles distant, being able to hear what information was being passed on from German Military Headquarters to the various commanders would have been a bonus. Details of new decisions, military movements, when and where the different commanders would be at different times, when important meetings were being arranged with Hitler and so on. Of course, Britain did have its means of intelligence, both sides had spies often planted in important organisations. But to be able to "hear" commands and instruction moments after they had been given would have been a bonus to the British war effort.

In August 1939, the Polish government gave Britain a German code machine that they had seized when it was sent to the German Legislation in Warsaw, complete with the methods on how any codes being sent could be deciphered. Britain already had one of these machines that had been invented in Holland and a German company took out a patent on the machine in 1923. Acquiring it in 1928 and not knowing too much about the machine which Britain called the Tippex, and unable to work out its fundamentals, the British put it away and there it remained gathering dust.

The German name for the machine was Enigma, and Britain as well continued to use it by this name although some sources state that it was called Ultra by the British. "Ultra" was actually a codename for messages and intelligence that had been derived from Enigma. Once Britain realised the value of Enigma and how important a part it could play, it was thought that only two commanders in the Royal Air Force, ACM Hugh Dowding and AVM Keith Park knew of its existence other than certain members of the War Office. In actual fact, historian Martin Gilbert has found that because messages were very slow in being deciphered, the information was often 48 hours old before it could have been handed to Fighter Command, and that Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 when Dowding was added to the list of people that were made aware of Enigma's existence. In reality, most 'Ultra' decrypts were of limited value during the Battle of Britain, mainly due to the slow deciphering of the machine. The Germans changed the rotors of the machine daily which meant that each day the British had to determine which had been changed so that any codes could continue to be broken.

It is a well known fact that Enigma was of great assistance to the British from 1941 onwards when they were able to decipher the codes more quickly and efficiently. But it is not a proven fact that Enigma was of any assistance to ACM Hugh Dowding. Two historians seem to differ on this fact, and also Martin Gilbert was supposed to have found evidence that Dowding did not know of its existence is mentioned by historian John Ray:

According to Winterbotham, who was a senior Air Intelligence officer, both Dowding and Park benefited from a foreknowledge of German intentions, a claim supported by historians as eminent as Ronald Lewin and John Terraine. However, the record was set straight by Martin Gilbert, who showed that not until 16 October 1940 was the C-in-C added to the list of those privy to Enigma. Hinsley states of Enigma, `the deductions were of no operational value to the C-in-C, Fighter Command,' and that Dowding had to depend on `his own strategic judgement,' without help.
John Ray Battle of Britain - New Perspectives p59 Arms & Armour Press 1994

We could compare the above with Richard Townshend Bickers, who based his information on Enigma on the reports of Group Captain F.W.Winterbotham who was the man in charge of Enigma:
The Germans had called their first cyphering machine `Enigma' and the British gave this name to all German cyphers. `Ultra' was the British codename for intelligence derived from Enigma and other machine cyphers. The only two commanders in the RAF who knew of Enigma and Ultra were Dowding and No. 11 Group's Air Vice Marshal Keith Park. A specific instance of its importance in the Battle of Britain was that the heavy air raids on August 15, 1940 did not take these two senior officers by surprise. The information given to them was precise: Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 would make the attacks, which were timed to keep the defenders at full stretch throughout the day. F. W. Winterbotham, who, as a group captain, was responsible for Ultra, recorded that Dowding told him that it was of the greatest help to him to know what Goering's policy was and enabled him to use his fighter squadrons with the greatest possible economy.
Richard Townshend Bickers Battle of Britain p59 Salamander 1999
So, did Enigma help Dowding on August 15th 1940 as Winterbotham stated in Bickers book. If this is true, then why didn't Enigma help Dowding when Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes were taken by surprise on August 18th 1940. And why didn't Enigma help Dowding when London was attacked on September 7th 1940. If they knew that an attack was to be made on London, why did Dowding ask AVM Keith Park to leave 11 Group HQ and join him in a conference at Fighter Command HQ.

On these theories, we can only be led to believe that the writings of John Ray are the more correct, which in turn means that Dowding did not have access to Enigma, and further to that, Intelligence had still not been able to efficiently interpret and decypher the German codes accurately during the time of the Battle of Britain.


LISTENING IN TO GERMANY BY RADIO

It became apparent to RAF Intelligence that not all transmitted broadcasts would be in code. It was unclear as to what transmissions would be sent in morse code and what would be sent by the spoken word. Whichever way it was, if RAF Intelligence could pick up German transmissions it would most certainly be of valuable assistance and there was always the possiblity that Germany would give away vital pieces of information that would allow the RAF to know of every move the Luftwaffe would be making.

The organisation that was responsible for radio intelligence was known as the Y Service. They would listen in to spoken word messages as well as coded messages that were sent to the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. These messages were to provide information as to Luftwaffe strength, proposed attacks and various movements. All this information aquired by the Y Service was sent to Air Intelligence at the Air Ministry. Quite often messages were picked up from E-boats out to sea, although this information was of little use to the Air Ministry, they passed all German naval intercepted messages on to the Admiralty.

In the first three months of the war, the only messages picked up were in morse using the W/T (Wireless telegraphy) method. It was soon realised that ham radio operators were picking up voice messages which they could not understand on the 40 megacycle band using R/T (Radio telegraphy). RAF Intelligence purchased some American Hallicrafter 510 units that could pick up the 40 megacycle band, and by March 1940, had them set them up at Hawkinge Kent. Almost immeadiately they commenced to pick up German radio transmissions. The only problem was, was that they seemed to have overlooked the fact that Germans actually speak the German language, and no one in the RAF at Hawkinge spoke or understood the language. It has been said that luckily, an AA gun operator with the army stationed on the base did understand German so he was quickly transferred into the RAF and operated a radio instead of an anti-aircraft gun.

Within the next couple of months, the RAF went on a recruiting campaign from within the Womens Auxiliary Air Service (WAAFs) in an effort to find personnel who not only understood German, but who had actually lived in Germany because they would have a better understanding of the various dialects. By the beginning of the Battle of Britain, six or seven women had been found and were working as Intelligence Operators from a new base at Fairlight in Sussex.

The WAAFs picked up the R/T messages very quickly and German call signs became very familiar. They listened in to Luftwaffe pilots having conversation with each other and soon it was realised that German aircrew had no respect for secrecy and often would mention the number of aircraft that would be in the formation and in many cases let their destination slip. This information was invaluable to RAF Intelligence, and it was not long before the Air Ministry realised the contribution that these 'listenning posts' were providing to the war effort, that following requests from other 'Groups' within Fighter Command, more branches of the Y Service were set up in 10 Group at Street in Devon, in 12 Group at Gorleston in Norfolk, and for 13 Group at Scarborough in Yorkshire. 11 Groups 'listenning post' at Fairlight was moved to West Kingsdown in Kent and became the headquarters of the Home Defence Unit as it now became officially known as.


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