Regarding the continuation of the attacks on the enemy Air Force and aircraft industry, the following points will require more attention than hitherto, if our losses are to be kept down to the minimum, and the enemy Air Force swiftly and irrevocably destroyed.

Untilfurther notice, the main task of Luftflotten 2 and 3 will be to inflict the utmost damage possible on the enemy fighter forces. With this are to be combined attacks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers, conducted however in such a manner as to avoid all unnecessary losses. I will return later to the question of operations against the enemy aircraft industry.

The difficulties inherent in such a great task make it essential that while avoiding any rigid plan, the whole operation must be planned and carried through with the utmost care. This can only be possible if unit commanders at all levels are of the best type. I have therefore ordered that in future, unit commanders are to be appointed regardless of rank and exclusively from among the most suitable and capable officers. Where possible such officers should be appointed from their own unit.

Immediate steps are to be taken by Luftflotten, Korps and Gruppen to test the suitability of all subordinate unit commanders, with a view to effecting exchanges and removals where necessary. Not only unsuitable, but also highly inexperienced officers whose lack of experience may lead to unnecessary losses, must be replaced. Otherwise suitable but inexperienced officers must serve under a really seasoned commander until such time as the latter is prepared to recommend their promotion.

We must as far as possible avoid a state of ajfairs in which our aircrews are kept in constant readiness for operations, as this must inevitably fatigue our units. In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations, in which they can indirectly protect the bombers, and at the same time come to grips under favourable conditions with the enemy fighters. No rigid plan can be laid down for such operations, as their conduct must depend on the changing nature of enemy tactics, and on weather conditions.

Wherever feasible, fighters are also to attack the enemy on the ground. They must however be protected on such missions by succeeding waves of other fighters. Twin-engined fighters are to be employed where the range of single-engined aircraft is insufficient, or where they can facilitate the breaking off from combat of single-engined formations.

The protection of returning bombers and fighters over the Channel must be assured by specially designated fighter
formations. The same applies to the defence of our own ground organisation. Young pilots not considered sufficiently experienced to fly over England could usefully carry out this latter task under the leadership of veteran pilots. The training of these young pilots and the importance of adequate supervision during their first operations are matters which cannot be too strongly emphasised.

As long as the enemy fighter defences retain their present strength, attacks on aircraft factories must be carried out under cover of weather conditions permitting surprise raids made by solitary aircraft. Such operations demand the most meticulous preparation, but can achieve very satisfactory results. The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next few days must be exploited for such attacks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the material supplies of the enemy Air Force, by the destruction of the relatively small number of aircraft engine and aluminium plants.

These attacks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried out by night. Should it however not be possible to locate an industrial target because of poor visibility or bad weather conditions, some other worthwhile target must be attacked. It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations to allocate to units particular areas which they will come to know better during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result and flights will not be wasted due to the failure of the aircraft to find one particular target. There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool.

Experience has shown the efficieny of light anti-aircraft defences on enemy naval vessels. Crews must therefore take care not to fly over them unless they are actually to be attacked.

My remarks concerning the allocation to units of certain areas for night raids apply also to daylight operations. The more thoroughly the units know their operational areas, the greater will be their success. This is of special importance for fighter units.

Many barrage balloons have been shot down recently. Units should be advised not to attack such targets unless it is absolutely necessary for the conduct of the operation, or unless the attacking aircraft can do so in perfect safety.

Effective co-operation between bombers and fighters by means of conferences between unit commanders is essential for the success of combined operations and time must be allowed for this before an attack. Hurried orders and precipitate missions are impossible in the war against England; they can only lead to severe losses and setbacks.

To sum up: we have reached the decisive period of the air war against England. The vital task is to turn all means at our disposal to the defeat of the enemy Air Force. Our first aim is the destruction of the enemy’s fighters. If they no longer take the air, we shall attack them on the ground, or force them into battle by directing bomber attacks against targets within the range of our fighters. At the same time, and on a growing scale, we must continue our activities against the ground organisation of the enemy bomber units. Surprise attacks on the enemy aircraft industry must be made by day and by night. Once the enemy Air Force has been annihilated, our attacks will be directed as ordered against other vital targets.
REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GORING
Karinhall, August 19, 1940